University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1986

Federal Law in State Supreme Courts.
Daniel J. Meador

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Meador, Daniel J., "Federal Law in State Supreme Courts." (1986). Constitutional Commentary. 172.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/172

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

FEDERAL LAW IN STATE SUPREME
COURTS
Daniel J. Meador*
The growth of federal law during the middle and late twentieth
century and the consequent increase of litigation are well-known
phenomena of American legal life. Whenever Congress extends federal law into new fields or creates new federal rights or liabilities it
sets the stage for more litigation. Supreme Court decisions giving
fresh interpretations to constitutional and statutory provisions likewise stimulate judicial business. Many commentators have discussed the profound effects of this increase in litigation on all levels
of the federal judiciary-the district courts, the courts of appeals,
and the Supreme Court. However, little attention has been paid to
the impact on state courts of this growth in federal law. Understanding more precisely the involvement of state courts with federal
law is not merely a matter of academic interest; this involvement
has important ramifications affecting the jurisdictional and structural relationships of federal and state courts.
Only one serious effort has been made to measure the role of
federal law in state court adjudication. That study was completed
in 1981 by the National Center for State Courts. Its key findings
are summarized in the first part below. To supplement that study I
have procured more recent data from other states, summarized in
the second part. In the third section I identify some of the significant consequences for the American judiciary of increased federal
law involvement in the work of state courts.
FEDERAL LAW IN FOUR STATE SUPREME COURTS:
1959 AND 1979
The National Center study focused on the Supreme Courts of
four states: California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Virginia. The objective was to determine the extent to which federal law was involved in the decisions of those four courts in 1959, and then twenty
years later in 1979.1 Research was confined to the opinions of the
•
I.

James Monroe Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
Comparison of Federal Legal Influences on State Supreme Court Decisions in 1959
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states' highest courts because that is where the federal law elements
could most readily be identified. The authors assumed that the extent of federal law involvement in state supreme court decisions
provides at least a rough measure of federal law involvement in all
state court litigation. In any event, the impact of state court adjudication on the work of the United States Supreme Court is determined almost entirely by state supreme court decisions involving
federal law and not by litigation in the lower state courts.
Federal law can be involved in state supreme court opinions in
two ways: (1) the state supreme court can squarely decide a question of federal law, or (2) the court, when deciding a state law question, can look to federal law analogies or to persuasive reasoning in
federal court opinions. The National Center study attempted to
identify each of these kinds of federal law involvement in the opinions it surveyed. Without going into the details of that study, it
suffices here to say that in the four state supreme courts federal law
was involved in one way or another in 14% of the cases in 1959 and
42% of the cases in 1979.2 This represents a three-fold growth in
the extent of federal law involvement in state adjudication during
that twenty-year period. However, the amount of such growth varied from one state to another and between civil and criminal cases
within the same state.
Table 1, compiled from data in the National Center study,
presents the key figures for each state. The figures in this table are
the percentages of the courts' opinions involving federal law in relation to the total number of the courts' opinions in each category
shown.
Perhaps the two most striking facts revealed by this table are
these: (1) in both civil and criminal cases the supreme court in each
state experienced a significant twenty-year growth in the amount of
federal law with which it had to deal and (2) the increase of federal
law in criminal cases was far greater than it was in civil cases. Indeed, in Connecticut only a small percentage of criminal cases lack
federal elements. These statistics substantiate the widespread view
that in many respects the state criminal process has become federalized as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decisions
under the fourteenth amendment. It should be underscored that
these figures reflect all degrees of federal law involvement in these
and 1979, Legislation For The Improvement of The Judiciary: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 293 (1982) (this
study was funded by the Federal Justice Research Program administered by the former Office
for Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as NCSC Study].
2. NCSC Study, supra, at 296.
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TABLE 1
FEDERAL LAW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS,
1959 AND 1979
Civil

California
Connecticut
Illinois
Virginia

1959

1979

16.2%
7.2%
17.4%
3.4%

46.7%
31.9%
24.7%
14.5%

Criminal
1979
1959
28.8%
31.2%
14.6%
17.6%

72.8%
93.5%
70.5%
54.7%

All Cases
1979
1959
20.1 o/o
10.3%
16.5%
5.3%

58.6%
45.4%
37.4%
27.1 o/o

state supreme court decisions; the percentage of opinions in which
federal questions were squarely decided-and hence potentially reviewable by the Supreme Court-was smaller, although still
significant.
SEVEN STATE SUPREME COURTS: 1983
To obtain similar data from other states, and to provide more
recent information, I employed law students to survey the 1983
opinions of the supreme courts of seven states: Arizona, Colorado,
Georgia, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Ohio.3 These
states are diverse geographically, in size, and in the nature of their
populations and judicial business. All except Mississippi have intermediate appellate courts.
The results of my study, shown in Table 2, reveal substantial
variation in the impact of federal law in the various states. The
least involvement is in Minnesota with 28% and the greatest is in
New Jersey with 69%. The National Center study showed a range
in 1979 from 27.1% in Virginia to 58.6% in California.4 The overall percentage in the four states surveyed in 1979 was 41%, whereas
the overall percentage in the seven states surveyed in 1983 was
49%.
3. Each opinion was analyzed to determine whether the court actually decided a question of federal law or whether the court simply cited or referred to federal law in some fashion but without squarely deciding any federal question. It is not always clear, of course,
whether a federal question is actually being decided, and there is sometimes room for differences of interpretation and judgment. Because of that circumstance and because these judgments were being made by law students, it is possible that the figures are not completely
accurate. However, errors are not likely to affect significantly the overall statistical pattern.
4. The figures in this column were obtained through a combination of published reports and information provided to the author by the state court administrators.
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TABLE 2
STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS INVOLVING
FEDERAL LAW, 1983

Total
Opinions5

State

Opinions
Deciding
Federal
Questions

Opinions
Citing
Federal
Law

Total
Opinions
Involving
Federal
Law

Opinions
Not
Involving
Federal
Law

Arizona

137

52 (38%)

34 (25%)

86 (63%)

51 (37%)

Colorado
Georgia

221

68 (31%)

53 (24%)

121 (55%)

100 (45%)

331

122 (37%)

21 ( 7%)

143 (44%)

188 (56%)

Minnesota
Mississippi

332

57 (17%)

38 (II%)

95 (28%)

237 (72%)

219

46 (22%)

66 (31%)

112 (52%)

107 (48%)

75

30 (40%)

22 (29%)

52 (69%)

252

28 (II%)

55 (22%)

83 (33%)

23(31%)
169 (67%)

New Jersey
Ohio

Table 2 also shows that in 1983 in some states federal law was
involved mainly by way of citation rather than by way of square
decision. In Ohio, for example, federal questions were decided in
only half as many cases as those in which federal law was merely
cited. Mississippi also exhibited this pattern. In other states the
cases in which federal law was decided outnumbered those in which
it was merely cited. The most extreme illustration of this pattern
was Georgia: 37% of its opinions decided federal questions,
whereas federal law was merely cited in only 7%. That pattern suggests that some state courts look to federal law when required to do
so in order to decide a federal question, but otherwise pay relatively
little attention to it.
Perhaps the most striking fact overall shown by Table 2 is that
four of these seven state supreme courts decided federal questions in
nearly a third or more of all cases. The Ohio Supreme Court, in
which only 11% of the opinions decided federal questions, appears
to be unusual.
Table 3 takes the opinions in which federal questions were actually decided (the second column in Table 2) and classifies them
into three categories: civil, criminal, and postconviction.
Realistically, the figures for criminal cases should be combined
with those for post-conviction cases because the latter (although
civil in theory) involve a review of criminal proceedings. Viewed
that way, the data shown here confirm the widespread assumption
that federal questions in state courts appear mainly in criminal
5.

NCSC Study, supra note I, at 296.

351

FEDERAL LAW

1986]

TABLE 3
STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS DECIDING
FEDERAL QUESTIONS, 1983
State
Arizona
Colorado
Georgia
Minnesota
Mississippi
New Jersey
Ohio

Total

Civil

52
68
122
57
46
30
28

8 (15%)
15 (22%)
17(14%)
24 (42%)
20 (43%)
15 (50%)
14 (50%)

Criminal
44
45
90
31
21
14
12

(85%)
(66%)
(74%)
(54%)
(46%)
(47%)
(43%)

Postconviction
0 ( 0%)
8 (12%)
15 (12%)
2 ( 4%)
5(11%)
I ( 3%)
2 ( 7%)

cases. New Jersey and Ohio are the only exceptions; in those two
states federal law appears equally in civil and criminal litigation.
In compiling the data on federal questions actually decided, we
identified the nature of each such question. Table 4, set out in an
appendix, lists the federal questions by the constitutional provision
or doctrine involved and by reference to the federal statute involved. Not surprisingly, constitutional questions far outnumbered
statutory questions. As Table 4 shows, during 1983 these seven
state supreme courts collectively decided a total of 535 federal constitutional law questions, but they decided only thirty-two issues
under federal statutes. These federal statutory questions arose
under twenty-seven different acts of Congress. It seems clear that
no single federal legislative enactment depends heavily on state
courts for its enforcement. However, state courts do form an important part of the judicial machinery for interpreting and applying
the Federal Constitution.
RAMIFICATIONS
The National Center study showed a three-fold increase of federal law in state supreme court decisions between 1959 and 1979.
The 1983 data set out above show that there has been no diminution
since 1979 and that indeed the involvement of federal law in state
supreme court opinions may be continuing to grow. In the seven
states surveyed in 1983, federal law was involved in 49% of the
cases and federal questions were actually decided in 28% of all of
the opinions. What are the ramifications of this situation?

U.S. Supreme Court Docket
Consider first the docket of the United States Supreme Court.
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Concern about the Court's workload in recent years has focused on
the increasing difficulties encountered by the Justices in monitoring
the work of the thirteen United States courts of appeals. What is
often slighted in these discussions is the fact that the Supreme Court
must also act as a court of last resort on federal questions for the
fifty state court systems, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
Statistics are not currently available to show the total number of
decisions rendered annually by these fifty-two jurisdictions, but it is
clear that the number runs high into the thousands. If the data
derived from the seven states surveyed in 1983 present a reasonably
accurate picture for the nation as a whole, more than a quarter of
those opinions would involve decisions on questions of federal law,
thereby opening the way for Supreme Court review. This means
that a very substantial pool of potential Supreme Court business is
being generated by the fifty-two non-federal court systems.
According to statistics supplied by the Office of the Clerk of
the Supreme Court, during the 1981 Term 1,255 cases were brought
to that Court from the fifty state systems, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico. During the 1983 Term there were 1,095 such
cases.6 These cases represent over a quarter of all filings in the
Supreme Court for those terms. If federal law involvement continues to rise in state court business, these filings will increase. In any
event, the substantial amount of state court adjudication of federal
law must be taken into account in considering the Supreme Court's
workload problem and related proposals for reforms.
Writing State Supreme Court Opinions

The Court's workload is affected by the manner in which state
court opinions are written. This is because the way in which the
state opinion employs federal law determines whether the state decision is reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. The classic
rule is that a state court decision will be reviewable only if the state
court actually decides a question of federal law and if that federal
question is controlling in the case. Mere discussion and citation of
federal law will not make the decision reviewable. This gives the
state court judges a measure of control over the reviewability of
their decisions. In some cases it is possible for the state judges to
draft an opinion disposing of the case without resting the decision
on federal law, even though the parties' arguments stressed federal
issues.
6.

These figures for the 1981 and 1983 Tenns were supplied informally to the author

by the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long7 has heightened the importance of careful attention to the drafting of opinions
by state supreme court judges. Under that decision a state court
case is reviewable by the Supreme Court if the state opinion discusses federal questions without making it crystal clear that the decision is being rested solely on a state law ground. With federal law
now involved in so much state court litigation, the judges of the
state supreme courts have more opportunity than ever before to
craft their opinions in a way that will control their reviewability in
the Supreme Court. In some cases the state judges may want their
decisions to be reviewable; in others, they may not. Whatever their
view on this matter, they are today being much more frequently
confronted with the problem than in decades gone by, when federal
law played a smaller part in state court work.
New Structures for Federal Appellate
Review of State Decisions

Since the early 1970's efforts have been underway to devise
means of overcoming the two difficulties besetting the federal judicial structure at the top: (1) the overload on the Supreme Court,
which renders it difficult for the Justices to give adequate attention
to the important questions with which they should deal, and (2) the
inability of the federal appellate structure as a whole to deliver the
number of decisions with nationwide binding effect necessary to
maintain uniformity in the administration of federal law. If the volume of litigation continues to grow, as is likely, and the percentage
of federal law questions in state court litigation remains high or increases, the business generated by these fifty-two jurisdictions will
make it increasingly difficult for the Supreme Court alone to monitor the administration of federal law in those courts. Thus, in
thinking about solutions for these problems, it would be well to bear
specifically in mind the state court component of the Supreme
Court's work and to think about restructuring the federal appellate
system to provide a means for maintaining evenhandedness among
these non-federal tribunals.
Among the various new devices that have been discussed in
recent years, the idea of employing the U.S. courts of appeal to review state decisions on federal questions deserves renewed consideration in light of this study. This idea is as old as the republic.
Hamilton noted the possibility in the 82nd Federalist:
I perceive at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state
7.

463

u.s.

1032 (1983).
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courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages attending the
power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish the motives to the multiplication of federal courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated to contract
the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The state tribunals may then be left
with a more entire charge of federal causes; and appeals in most cases in which they
may be deemed proper instead of being carried to the supreme court, may be made
to lie from the state courts, to district courts of the union.

There are various ways in which state cases could be routed to the
regional federal appellate courts. One is simply to vest jurisdiction
in those courts to review all state decisions in which a controlling
question of federal law has been decided. In other words, this
would transfer the present Supreme Court jurisdiction over state
decisions to the regional federal appellate courts. Supreme Court
review would remain available through certiorari after the regional
appellate court decision. This arrangement would, of course, increase the caseload for each of the twelve geographical federal circuits. However, the increase for each would not be unmanageable,
although a few additional circuit judgeships might be necessary to
deal with this added business. The main effect of this change would
be to provide a more meaningful federal appellate review of state
court decisions on federal law, thereby increasing the federal judiciary's capacity to maintain nationwide uniformity in the administration of federal law. Of course, discrepancies might arise, as they do
now, among the twelve courts of appeals, but the Supreme Court,
relieved of responsibility for reviewing fifty state courts (plus the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico), would be in a better position to monitor the federal appellate courts.
Another possibility would be to vest the regional appellate
courts with jurisdiction to review state supreme court decisions in
criminal cases only.s As the data from the two studies here show,
federal law plays a much larger role, generally speaking, in criminal
cases than it does in civil. In criminal cases the overall percentage
involving federal law from the four states in 1979 was 72%; in the
seven states in 1983 it was 59%. One might argue that uniformity
is more important in the administration of criminal justice, particularly in the areas covered by constitutional rules, than in the miscellaneous assortment of civil litigation that involves federal law. In
any event the criminal volume is greater, and there is thus a practical need for a greater federal appellate capacity. Again, the federal
circuit decisions on these federal law questions would be reviewable
on certiorari by the Supreme Court. This arrangement would leave
8. This idea is explained in Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 273 (1983).
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civil cases reviewable directly from the state supreme courts in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Whatever arrangements one may prefer, the point is that serious thought needs to be given to providing a greater federal appellate capacity to monitor the large and growing percentage of federal
questions being dealt with by the fifty-two non-federal judicial systems of the nation.
Federal Funding for State Courts

Until well after the middle of the twentieth century the idea
that the federal government should assist in funding the courts of
the states would have been viewed as heretical, if not unconstitutional. However, beginning in the 1960's federal funds began to be
channeled to the state courts as part of the "war on crime" that
gripped the country at that time. Since then it has become generally
accepted that it is appropriate for federal funding to be employed to
improve the state judicial systems. With the creation by Congress
of the State Justice Institute in 1984, such funding has now been
institutionalized on a permanent basis.9 The purpose of the Institute will be to provide several million dollars annually to improve
the courts of the several states. One of the major reasons justifying
such federal financial support is that the state courts, in addition to
handling most of the nation's adjudication, perform a large role in
the enforcement of federal law. Inasmuch as such a significant portion of state judicial manpower is devoted to federal purposes, it is
not inappropriate that federal funding assist those judicial systems
in developing more effective procedures and in bringing into service
the most advanced technology.
Reallocation of Jurisdiction Over Federal Cases

One of the features of American federalism that makes our law
confusing and litigation complicated and expensive is the coexistence of two judicial systems-one state and one federal. We have
state trial courts and federal trial courts sitting side by side with
concurrent jurisdiction over many cases. Much of the federal law
involvement in state courts occurs in cases over which federal trial
courts also have jurisdiction. Our legal system would be simplified
if, in many of these situations, exclusive jurisdiction were vested in
either a state trial court or a federal district court.
Whenever exclusive jurisdiction over federal cases is discussed,
9. State Justice Institute Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3336 (1984). The
Institute did not begin functioning until its Board of Directors was appointed in 1986.
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attention focuses mainly on the possibility of vesting such jurisdiction in the federal district courts. However, since state courts are
already adjudicating a significant proportion of federal issues, perhaps they should be given even more federal law cases and jurisdiction should be exclusive. Truth-in-lending and FELA cases are two
examples of fields where this might be done. A move in that direction would require an important policy decision by Congress. Such
a choice may become increasingly attractive as the volume of litigation in the federal district courts continues to rise and as there is
continuing pressure for even more federal judgeships. Transferring
some of that jurisdiction to the state courts, where the judges are
already heavily engaged in adjudicating federal law, may be an attractive option for Congress to consider, especially when it creates
new federal statutory rights. The option may become even more
attractive when one recalls that Congress is already channeling federal money to the state courts and will continue to do so indefinitely
through the State Justice Institute. Vesting certain federal question
cases exclusively in the state courts would, of course, justify even
more federal funding for the state courts, but this would probably
be cheaper than additional federal judgeships and personnel for the
federal courts.
Support for exclusive state jurisdiction over some federal cases
might come from those who perceive distinct disadvantages in an
ever-expanding federal judiciary. There is a deeply held notion that
the federal courts should remain relatively small and should be reserved for matters of special federal concern. Many of the federal
law questions being adjudicated by state courts are not of that sort,
and giving those courts exclusive jurisdiction would impair no major national interest. The more federal law business that the state
courts take on, however, the greater will be the need for a revised
federal appellate structure to prevent nonuniformity. If the federal
appellate capacity is enlarged-for example, by authorizing the
courts of appeals to review state judgments-"The state tribunals
may then be left with a more entire charge of federal causes," as
Hamilton put it in the 82nd Federalist. Thus, these concerns are all
related: the volume of federal law in state court litigation, the exclusivity of such state court jurisdiction, the federal appellate structure, and the federal funding of state courts.
The two surveys described here are merely illustrative of the
kinds of inventories that should be run annually on a more precise
basis in all of the states. It is clear that federal law now plays an
important, regular part in state court adjudication. We need to
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measure that phenomenon more precisely in order to decide how
best to arrange the totality of state-federal judicial business in the
United States.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 4
STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS- NATURE OF
FEDERAL QUESTIONS DECIDED, 1983
Federal Question

AZ

co

GA

MN

MS

NJ

OH

CONSTITUTIONAL (Total)
Burden of Proof/Sufficiency of Evidence
Civil Commitment
Commerce Clause
Confessions/Miranda
Confrontation Clause
Contract Clause
Death Sentences
Double Jeopardy
Effective Assistance of Counsel
Eighth Amendmen !/Sentencing
Eminent Domain
Ex Post Facto
Fair Trial
First Amendment
Full Faith & Credit
Grand Jury Proceedings
Guilty Pleas
Identification
Jury Impartiality
Misc. Due Process/Equal Protection
Overbreadth!V agueness
Parole Revocation
Privileges & Immunities
Right to Counsel
Right to Jury
Search & Seizure
Self-Incrimination
Speedy Trial
Supremacy Clause

91
3

83
2

191
67

66

42
3

36

26

STATUTORY (Total)
Bank Holding Company Act
Bankruptcy Act
Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Civil Rights Attys. Fees Award Act
Environmental Regs.
Equal Pay Act
Farm Credit Act
Federal Arbitration Act
Federal Credit Union Act
FELA
Federal Parole Commission &
Reorganization Act
Fishery Conservation & Management Act
FRCP 26(b)
Gam. St. Germain Depository lnst. Act of

2
I
II

6

2

2
2

3
2

16
4
5
2

6
2

7
3
8
2

I

I

2

2

I

3
2
2
3

2

3

2

I

4

2

2
3

5

3

2

10

7

8
2
2

2
2
4

2
I

II

2
2
2
4
2
45
4

I

I

5
5

3

II

3

2

10

18
5

10

17
3

7

7

5

10

2

2
2

3
2

7

21

7

8
3

I

7
16

I

4

2

5

2

4
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TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)
Federal Question
1982
Interstate Commerce Act
Jones Act
Judiciary & Judicial Procedure - Interest
(28 u.s.c. § 1961)
Labor-Management Reporting Act
Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act
Rules of Decision Act
Sherman Act
Shipping & Vessels Regulation
(46 u.s.c. § 262, 319, 911)
State Juris. over Indians
Truth-in-Lending Act
Urban Mass Transportation Act
Voting Rights Act
Water Rights Suits Act

AZ

CO

GA

MN

MS

NJ

OH

